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New Evidence that Taxes Affect the Valuation of Dividends
ABSTRACT
This paper uses British data to examine the effectsof dividend
taxes on investors' relative valuation of dividendsandcapitalgains.
British data offer great potential to illuminate thedividends and taxes
question, since there have been two radical changes and severalminor reforms
in British dividend tax policy during the lasttwenty-five years. Studying
the relationship between dividends and stockprice nxvements during different
tax regimesoffers anideal controlled experiment for assessing the effectsof
taxesoninvestors' valuation of dividends. Usingdaily data on a small
sample of firms, and inth1y data on a xrnich broadersample, we find clear evi-
dence that taxes change equilibriumrelationships between dividend yields and
market returns. These findings suggest that taxesare important determinants











(617) 95—2I7Financial economists have long been puzzled by corporate dividend
behavior. It would seem thatrationalpersonal investors should valuea
dollarof corporate dividends less highly than a dollar of corporate reten-
tions, because the former gives riseto greater tax liabilities. On the other
hand,corporations face equalcostsof paying out dividends and retaining ear-
nings. As Miller and Modigliani (1961) deinstrated, in the absence of taxes
dividend policy should have no effect on share valuation. It follows that if
dividends are tax penalized, the value maximizing strater for a firm would
involve paying no dividends. It is therefore surprising that dividend
payments to taxable investors are widespread. In 1981, dividend tax reve-
nues in the United States were estimated to exceed twenty billion dollars.1
Indeed, some have interpreted the large volume of dividends paid as evi-
dence against the rational behavior postulates typically used by economists.
The dividend question has stimulated a large theoretical and
empirical literature concerned with the question of investors' valuation of
dividends. In particular, the question of how taxes affect the market
valuation of dividends has generated considerable controversy. Numerous
studies including Litzenberger and Ramaswan (197'9, 1982), Auerbach (1983),
and Gordon and Bradford (1980), have isolated relationships between stock
returns and dividend yields which are consistent with the existence of tax
effects. Others, notably Miller and Scholes (1982), have suggested alter-
native explanations for the relationship. Indeed, Miller and Scholes go so
far as to claim that "after correcting ...forinformation effects, we find
no significant remaining relation between returns and expected dividend
yield —certainlynothing that could be considered a yield—related tax—2—
effect of the classic kind [1982, p.1131]."
A full understanding of how dividends affect returns remainsdif-
ficult to achieve. It appears unlikely thatwewill ever be able to devise
completely satisfactory empirical measures of ex—antereturns on securi-
ties. Most studies of dividend effects rely on the standard CAPM,with the
aggregate stock market used as a proxy for the market portfolio,in order
to imdel required returns. Substantial theoretical and empiricallitera-
tures cast doubt on the validity of this procedure. Ifex—ante returns are
mis—modelled and yields are correlated with required returns,dividend
yield effects will not be estimated consistently.This makes the isolation
and attribution of tax effects problematic.
This paper presents the results of our research on dividends and
taxes using British data. As Miller and Scholes argue, theidentification of
tax effects is likely to be impossible using data generatedunder a single tax
regime.British data offer great potential to illuminate the taxes anddivi-
dendsquestion because there have been two radical changesand a number of
minor changes in British dividend tax policy during the last 30 years.
Examination of the relationship between dividends and stock pricemovements
during different tax regimes offers an ideal controlled experimentfor
assessing the effects of taxes on investors' valuation ofdividends. This
opportunity is not available in the United States, wherethere have been no
comparably radical tax reforms.
Our results confirm the view that the taxation of dividends redu-
ces their relative valuation by investors. Using dailydata on a small—3—
sampleof companies and xnthly data on a much broader sample, clear evi-
dence thattaxes change equilibrium relationships between dividend yields
andnErket returns is presented. The finding that dividend taxes are
recognized by investors and affect the ex—ante returns which they demand
only deepens the puzzle of why firms pay dividends.
Thepaper is organized as follows. Section I describes the evolu-
tion of the British tax system over the last thirty years and discusses the
tax reforms which form the basis for our empirical tests. We consider both
the tax treatment of individual investors and the rules governing arbitrage
around ex—dividend days. Section II utilizes the ex-day methodolor to
examine tax effects for a small sample of companies. Section III describes our
primarydataset, the London Business School inthly share price data base,
and reports on the relationship between rnthlydividendyields andmarket
returnsduring alternative tax regimes. Section IV presents our conclusions
anddescribes several directions for future research.—1—
I.The Taxation of Dividends in the U.K.
The taxation of cor:porate income in Britain has been substantially
reformed twice during the last 20 years. This makes British data especially
powerfulintesting alternative hypotheses about the impact of taxes on the
market valuation of different forms of corporate income. If taxes affect the
relevant marginal investor, then the relative valuation of dividends and capi-
tal gains should change when the tax law changes. It appears that the major
changes in British corporate income taxation can safely be viewed as exoge-
nous. Both occurred following transitions of the political party in power,
after elections in which taxes were not an important issue.
The first important change occurred in 1965, when the newly—elected
Labour Government instituted a capital gains tax at a statutory rate of 30
percent. This reform should have increased the relative valuation ofdividend
income. The second change occurred in 19T3, when the Conversative government
introduced an integrated corporate income tax which effectively reduced the
dividend tax rate on personal and corporate investors and actually provided a
dividend subsidy to untaxed institutions.
We begin by clarifying how an integrated tax system like that intro—
duced in Britain in 1973 affects investors* relative valuation of dividends
and capital gains. To motivate this, assume different securities yield
different combinations of certain capital gains (g) and dividends (d)
per unit value. Let m equal the marginal dividend tax rate,and z the effec-
tive tax rate on capital gains. All investors face the same taxrates2 and
require an after tax return of p(1—z). Asset market equilibrium requires—5—
that:
(l—z)g +(l—m)d=p(1—z). (1)
Thetax unadjusted return on a share with dividend yield d and capital
gain g is R =g+d,and using (1) we can write
R=g+d=p+()d=p+dd
. (2)
The pretax return on higher yield securities is higher than that on low
dividend shares. This return just compensates investors for the extra
taxes they must pay. Prior to 1965,therewasnocapital gains tax so y =m.
Between 1965 and 1973, when Britain's tax system was very similar to that in
the United States, investors faced both dividend and capital gains taxes, and
(m—z)/(l—z).
In April 1973, the tax system was reformed in a waywhichsubstan-
tially reduced the tax rate applicable to dividend income. Investors are now
permitted to take a partial credit for corporate tax parments in evaluating
their dividend tax liability. This tax system is similar to the tax integra-
tion proposals which have been suggested to eliminate the "double taxation" of
dividends in the United States. Equivalently, in the post—1973 British system
thecorporate tax is a kind ofwithholding mechanism for collecting the divi-





wherem still denotes the dividend tax rate and w is the imputation rate.
This formula could, of course, also describe the pre—1973 system, with w =0.—6—
Theworkings of an imputation system are most easily demonstrated by
way of an example. Suppose a firmpaysa £2.00 dividend to a shareowner in
the 50 percent tax bracket. Assume that w =.33,implyingthat corporate tax
payments worth thirty three percent of the dividend canbe applied as a
credit against individual dividend taxes. Personal taxes are calculated on
grossedup dividends, rather than dividends net of withholdingat the cor-
porate level. Therefore, the tax base for the 50percentdividend tax is
£3,andtheshareholder's total tax liability is £1.50. Of this liability,
£1 is accounted for by the nney which was withheld at the corporate level,
leaving a personal tax liability of £.50, 25 percent of thedividend
received after withholding. For an investor in the 33 percent tax bracket, no
further taxes would be due. For shareholders with tax rates below w, the
Inland Revenue would provide a refund of (m—w)/(l—w) times thedividend.3
It is sometimes suggested that the relevant nmrginal investor for
the valuation of dividends is either a tax free institution or a broker—
dealer who engages in trading around the ex—day. Some discussion of the regu-
lations affecting dividend arbitrage is therefore needed. Prior to 197'O,
"dividend stripping" by trading around ex—days was apparently widespread.
Major changes in the tax rules .relating to dividend trading occurredin 19T0.
For an individual, after 1970, if trading around ex-days such as selling
shares before the ex—day and repurchasing them later reduced his tax liability
by more than 10 percent in any year, his transactions could bedeclared void.
He could be assessed for the tax to which he would have been liable if he did
not pursue this strate. The second jor class of investors is tax—exempt—7—
institutions.After 1910, their trading around ex—days could be declared void
if they bought and sold the share within one nth of the ex—day. In this
situation, the institution could be required to pay a partial tax. For tra-
ders in securities, the third major class of investors, both dividends and
realized capital gains are taxed at the personal income tax rate (for part-
nership dealers) or the corporate rate (for incorporated dealers). Since
1970, when a dealer trades in securities around ex—days and holds the shares
for less than a nth, a substantial fraction of his capital loss on the tran-
saction can be disallowed for tax purposes. As the holding period declines,
the fraction disallowed rises and can reach 100 percent.
While the interactions among these tax provisions are difficult to
describe, two facts stand out. First, the opportunities for avoiding taxes by
trading around ex—days were substantially reduced for all investors in 1970.
Tothe extent that tradingaround ex—days is importantindetermining ex—
dividendprice movements,we would expect to observe noticable changes around
1970.Second, the average tax burden on dividend income, relative to capital
gains,declined in 1965 and fell substantially in 1973.To provide someindi-
cator of these changes, Table 1 presents estimates of the average marginal tax
rates on dividends and capital gains implied by the tax rules and the distri-
bution of share ownership for the years 1955—1981. These tax rates were
calculated by first determining the marginal tax rates applicable to different
classes of shareholders assuming they did nothing to avoid taxes, and then
averaging these rates across investor classes with weights proportional to the
shareholders' total equity holdings. A detailed description of the proceduresTable I
Marginal Dividend andCapitalGains Tax Rates
Weighted Weighted
Average Average Excess Return
Marginal Effective Per Pound Of
Dividend Capital Gains Dividends
Year Tax Rate (in) TaxRate (z) (y)
1955 .518 0.0 .518
1956 .516 0.0 .516
1957 .515 0.0 .515
1958 .11.98 0,0 .11.98
1959 .11811. 0.0 .11811.
1960 .11.86 0.0 .11.86
1961 )485 0.0 )485
1962 .)483 0.0 .1183
1963 .11.83 0.0 .)483
196)4 .518 0.0 .518
1965* .533 0.0/.18)4 .5331.11.27
1966 .)489 .17)4 .381
1967 .)488 .172 .382
1968 .)48]. .169 .375
1969 .)469 .157 .370
1970 .)452 .152 .353
1971 .)4)4i .1)49 .3)46
1972 .11.20 .1)48 .319
1973* .11.021.011.9 .1)43 .302/—.109
197)4 .107 .13)4 —.031
1975 .0I9 .130 —.093
1976 —.015 .132 —.169
1977 —.0)45 .13)4 —.207
1978 —.050 .135 —.21)4
1979 —.069 .136 —.237
1980 —.129 .13)4 —.30)4
1981 —.121 .133 —.293
Average Values:
Regime I (1955—1965) .)4997 0.0 .11.997
RegimeII (1965—1973) .)4662 0.162 .3639
RegimeIII (1973 —)—.0277 0.13)4 —.187
Source: King (1977), King, Naldrett, and Poterba (198)4), and authors' calcula-
tions.The data for 1965 and 1973 refer to the nnths before and after
the April tax reforms.—9—
used in deriving these tax rates can be found in King (19T7) and King,
Naldrett and Poterba (1981).
The table shows both discrete changes in average marginal tax rates
caused by the two tax reforms, and continuing nvements which result
from trends in the pattern of share ownership. In 1955, more than two—
thirds of all equity was held by persons, who are the rst heavily taxed
class of investors. By 1981, this fraction had declined to less than forty
percent.5 The marked decline in personal holdings coincided with the
rapid rise in the value of institutional holdings, particularly untaxed
pension funds. These trends have reduced the marginal tax rates on both
dividends and capital gains. We should emphasize that the weighted average
tax rates are only designed to indicate the magnitudes of tax changes. No
theory holds that asset returns should be governed by weighted average margi-
nal tax rates of the type computed here.
The third column of Table I presents a summary measure for the
taxsyste&streatment of dividends andcapitalgains. Since our study is
directedat estimating yfrommarket data, it is informative to calculate the
valueswhichwould obtain ifmarketreturns reflected the average marginal tax
rates on all shareholders for the different tax regimes. The data clearly
reflect substantial variation.Prior to 1965, in what we refer to as Regime
I, y averages.50.Thisreflects a substantialtax burden on dividends and
the absence of capital gains taxes. Between 1965 and 1973, y averages .36,
lower than in Regime I largely because of the capital gains tax. Finally,
since 1973, y has actually been negative in many years. The average value of—10-
y during Regime III is—.18T.
With these benchmark values of the tax parameters in mind, we exa-
mine share prices to see if the tax changes have left a trace in the xrasured
pretax returns of different securities. In the succeeding two sections we
report estimates using daily andnnthlydata of the market's relative
valuation of dividends and capital gains under different tax regimes.
II.Dividend Valuation: Tests Using Daily Data
The xst straightforward test for the existence of dividend tax
effects on stock prices is the comparison of share price imvements and
dividendpayments on ex—dividend days. Numerous authors, including Elton
and Gruber (1970), Black and Scholes (19T3), Green (1980), Kaiay (1982),
Eades,Hessand Kim(1982),Auerbach (1983), Hess (1983), and others have
used daily data to analyze relative share price movements in the United
States.These studies have found that in general share prices do decline on
ex—days,but by less than the amount of the dividend.
These results have beeninterpretedas supporting the bypothesis
that taxes influence market behavior, since shareholders discount future divi-
dend taxes. However, this tax—based explanation has been subject to some cri-
ticism. Hess(1982, 1983) showedthat the restrictions implied bythe
after—taxCAPM are violated in dailyand monthly returns. However, since his
testsare jointtests of both the tax effects Iothesis and a particular
model of ex—ante security returns, it is difficult to decide whether the tax
hypothesis is at fault.—11 —
Blackand Scholes (1973), Green (1980) and Kalay (1982) raised a
second objection, suggesting that short—term trading by tax arbitrageurs ren-
ders the ex—day approach powerless in measuring tax effects. If short term
tradersarethe nRrginal investors around the ex—day, then estimated share
pricemovementswill not reflect the tax rates facing the firm's "usual"
clientele. Moreover, since one of the most likely arbitrageurs is the securi-
ties broker who faces identical tax rates on dividend income and on short term
capital gains (mz), this short term arbitrage should lead share prices to
decline by the full value of their dividends.6
As we noted above, there were changes in the rules concerning ex—day
trading during our sample period. This is particularly evident in the 1970
Finance Act. If the short—term trading hypothesis is correct, then we would
expect to see relative price movements which were closer to —1.0 before 1970
than in later years. As we shall see below, these predictions are not borne
out by the data. If anything, the opposite has occurred and relative price
movementshave narrowed in recent years. This is the prediction of the tax
effects hypothesis, not the short-term trading model, and explains in part why
we favor it asanexplanationof share price reactionsto dividends.
To estimate the share price response to dividends, we obtained daily
data on the share prices and dividends of sixteen large U.K. firms.7 A
listing of these firms and theperiods covered byour data ms.y be found in the
appendix. Using information on ex—dividend dates for these firms obtained
from the London Business School share price data tape, we consulted microfilm
copies of the Financial Times and recordedclosing share priceson the trading—12-.
daybefore the ex—date, the ex—date itself, andtheday after the ex—date.
For each firm in the sample, we included all ex—dates between 1955 and 1981
corresponding to cash dividend payments which were taxable as ordinary income
and not accompanied by any dividend rights, stock options, or other special
features.Ourdata set contained returnsfor633 ex—days and 616
non—ex—days.We also obtained data on the value of the Financial
Times—Actuaries500 ShareIndexfor each day on which prices were uasured,
and used this index to construct a market return series.
We estimated two xxdels for Rt, the total pretax return on security
i. The first is
16 3
=
8o+ 8 R +adtj
+'it
(14)
where is the marketreturn andis a company—specific coefficient
whichshould resenible the security's beta. The dividend yield on each day
is d1tj where j denotes the tax regime (I, II, or III) in which the dividend
falls.Thecoefficients reflect the excess pretax return on ex—dividend
days, an estimate of y for each tax regime. If the tax—effects bypothesis is
correct,then the parameter shoulddepend upon the relative tax rates on
dividendsand capital gains. In particular, we would expect to vary
across tax regimes.
The second equation which we estimated took a more agnostic approach
to modelling ex—ante returns, andintroducedfirm—specific intercept terms:—13 -
i6 i6 3
R.= iS.+ + ad.tj + 1 1 =1j1
Theseequations were estimated by a generalized least squares procedure
which allowed for heteroscedasticity across different firms.8 Since
there were few instances in which two firms had coincident ex—days, residual
correlation across firms was not an issue.
The results of our ex—day share price study are shown in Table II.
The first two rows show the results of estimating (li) and (5) for ex—dividend
days alone. There is clear evidence that the aj coefficients have changed
over time, with values between .3 and .inRegimes I and II and much
smaller values, between —.15 and —.1, in Regime III. This finding suggests
that changes in the capital gains tax rate, the principal difference between
Regimes I and II, did not exert a pronounced influence on ex—day price ve—
ments, but the reform of dividend taxation in 1973 did have a substantial
effect. The difference between the Regime II and Regime III coefficients
averaged across the two reported xdels is •1413, which is somewhat smaller
than the difference of .551 between the average values of y computed in Table
I.
We experimented with several variants on our ex—day equation.
First, we computed two—day returns for each security, assuming that the
investor held his shares for the ex—day and the following day. When we
repeated our regressions on the 2—day returns, the coefficients changed,






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































animpact on relative ex—day price movements remained.9 These equations are
reported as rows three and four in Table II. The same finding emerged when
weestimated our equations on daily data including the ex—days and the
followingday-sas independent observations. The estimates of a for the first
tworegimes rise to over .li., while the estimates for Regime III remain negative
the difference between the Regime II and III coefficients was of the same
magnitude as that computed using only ex—days. In each case, the dif-
ference between the Regime II and Regime III coefficients is statistically
significant at the 99 percent confidence level. Ourresultswere quite robust
with respect to the exclusion of particular firms; when the equations were
estimated separately for each firm, l4 of our 16 companies had estimated
Regime III coefficients which were smaller than those for Regime 111.10
We adopted another approach to testing the "tax—effects" hypothesis,
exploiting both the within—regime and the across—regime variation in tax
rates, by comparing ourestimate of afor each year with y in Table I. The
hypothesisthat a =ywas rejectedat standard significance levels. However,
testsusing cx =(m_w)/(1_w)t,imposing z. =0,did not reject the null
hypothesis. This suggests that our measures of capital gains tax rates may be
very imprecise indicators of actual tax rates.
Previous research, such as that of Gordon and Bradford (1980), has
documented the existence of large fluctuations in estimated tax effects
even over periods when the tax law was stable. To measure time series
variation, we re—estimated equation (2a) from Table II allowing separate
aj coefficients for each year. When the tax regime changed during the year,—16—
Table III








1962 .378 (.1911) :
1963 .276 (.205)
19611 .050 (.1T1)























Thedata set including only ex—days wasused.-17-.
we estinated separate coefficients for the two regimes. These resulting esti-
mates are showninTable III. The coefficients are clearly subject to
substantial variability, even within tax regimes. However, there is a pro-
nounced drop in these coefficients beginning inthesecond half of1973,again
suggestingthe importance of tax effects. There is no comparable change in
1970,whenthe tax rules on trading were changed.
While daily share price movements are likely to yield the most pre-
cise evidence on dividend valuation, they may becontaminated by tax arbitrage
orother unusual return patterns around ex-days. If taxes play an important
role in the valuation of dividend income, then it might be possible to detect
this phenomenon in a large sample of monthly security returns. While monthly
data are subject to various other biases, discussed below, we now turn to an
analysis of tax effects in monthly data for the period 1955—81.
III. Dividend Valuation: Tests Using Monthly Data
A.Methodolor
Asimple model, which we use as a point of departure for estima-
tion, is the after—tax CAPM described by Brennan (1970), Auerbach (1983), and
Gordon and Bradford (1980). The tax modified capital market line requires






where (l_m)rf is the after-tax risk—free rate of return, m =gand—18—
and dmt are the capital gains and dividends on the market portfolio, 8 =
Cov(flt,R)/Var(R), and inisthe marginal tax rate on interest income.
We useabove a return to show that it is measured after tax. Dividing
through expression (6) by (i—z) and manipulating terms yields
(1—8.)
R1t =+ dt=
(i—z)(l_m)rf + + (1—y)d1++ 'it
In dailydata,the variation over time ifl the risk free rate and
the market dividend yield is small, so we could approximate (7) by
• (8)
This was the equation which we estimated in the last section. In
monthly data, however, the specification of ex—ante returns is more






where is the total return on the market and is an error which assumed
to be uncorrelated across firms and time.11
To estimate this model, we first estimated a set of 8.foreach
it
firmfrom regressions of the total security return on the market return. We
allowed to vary during the sample, fixing it for five year intervals.
The results were not particularly sensitive to our choice of interval
length. We also tried a two—stage procedure which began by defining R =
dt
+g,estimating 8jt' and estimating CLforeach regime. We than redefined
=(1—a)d
+g,
similarly adjusted share returns as it =(1_CL)dlt
+—19—
andusedthese new returns to estimate new 'S.Thenew were then used to
form the left band side variable in (9).Ourresults were insensitive to
these experiments; the findings reported below correspond to s estimated
from unad.justed Rmt and Rt.
Estimating ad's from (9)maybesubject to serious biases if the
assumptions underlying the CAPM are not valid, or if 's cannot be accurately
estimated. infrequent trading and the failure of stock market returns to
measure the return on the whole constellation of assets held by investors
complicate the estimation of ,andthere is little evidence that firm B's
are stable over long time periods. These problems are probably substantial.
Fora relatively small open econoxay like Britain, it is especially unlikely
that the aggregate stock market is a very good proxy for total wealth.
Failure to adequately proxy ex—ante returns has potentially serious
consequences, particularly in working with monthly data. Because increases in
ex—ante returns depress stock prices, they will be associated with increases
in dividend price ratios. These may- lead to upwards biased estimates of the
tax effects on the valuation of dividends. To control for this possibility we
follow Miller and Scholes (1982), and add a variable where
represents the split—adjusted mean price of security i in our sample.
This variable is intended to pick up the effects of unmeasured risk changes
which affect the firm's price. The expected sign of this variable's coef-
ficient is positive. When the risk of a security rises, its price will decline
and provided dividends adjust slowly to new information its dividend yield
will rise. At the same time,theex-ante return on this security will rise,—2 0-
leading to a positive association between measured dividend yield and return.
To capture other possible misspecifications, the average dividend yield over
the past year, (D7P), was also added to equation (9).
We also employed an alternative approach which imposed fewer theore-
tical constraints on the data. We assumed that
Rt —(l_m)rf
=u+ + + cidt2 + a3dt3 + . (10)
Equation (10) is a standard idel in the analysis of covariance; it allows for
firm effects and time effects in describing stock market returns. Each firm
is assumed to have a constant required excess return on an after tax basis and
there is some "market news" which affects all firms at time t. In principle
equation (10) could be estimated directly by adding a dumn variable for each
firm and each nnth to our regressions. This is not practical due to the size
of our sample. An alternative approach, described in Maddala (1977), is to
subtract the means for each firm and for each month from each variable in
(10). We considered some ndels with only firm effects and others with both
firm effects and time effects. These were estimated as:
.t_R1. —(1_m)(rft_rf
)= xi(dti_d11i) (ii)
+ cz2(dt2—d.2) + cz3(dt3_dj.3) +
for firm effects, and
Rt_R1_Rt =a(d1ti_d1i_dti)+ (dt2_di2_dt2) (12)
+ a3(d1t3_d13_dt3) +
for firm arid time effects. The term R. is the average value of R.for firm
1. it
i, dii is the time average of dtj for firm i, and is the average return—21—
attimet acrossall firms.This procedureis numerically equivalent to doing
a regression with firm and time dummies, but it is much less computationally
burdensome. In estimating (11) and (12), we also allowed for unmeasured
changea in required returns by adding the inverse price level and the average
dividend yield variables, appropriately de—ineaned, to our equations.
Before presenting our nthly regression results, there is one
remaing methodological issue to discuss. This is the question of information
effects and the relationship between yields and returns. The problem arises
if dividends are announced and paid in the same nnth. In this case, there
will be a positive correlation between announced dividends and "dividend
news." Assuming that the announcement of higher than expected dividends
causes stock prices to rise, information effects will give rise to a spurious
positive correlation between yields and returns. Miller and Scholes (1982)
point out an additional, more subtle bias. Some firms that pay zero dividends
undoubtedly surprised and disappointed their shareholders by omitting their
dividend. This also leads to an upward bias in the estimate of the effect of
dividend yields on returns.
We adopted two different procedures for addressing this problem.
The first is a variant on one of the procedures used by Litzenberger and
Rainaswan' (1982).We included in the sample only observations for which
i) positive dividends were paid but had been announced in the preceding iiinth,
or ii) no dividends were paid but positive dividends had been paid within the
preceedingtwo nxnths. The logic of this selection rule is that market
participantsare unlikely to expect dividends to be paidwithintwo nnths-22.-
of a previous dividend payment,especiallysince in Britain dividends are
almost universally paid on a semi—annual basis. Restricting the sampleto
these observations should eliminate most of the bias due to information
effects.
Unfortunately, data on dividend announcement dates were only
available for part of oursampleperiod (1965—1977). The restricted sample
method could therefore not be used to estimate yield effects over the entire
1955—1981period.To obtain estimates for the full sample period, we adopted
an instrumental variable procedure similar to that suggested by McCallum
(1976) inthecontext of rational expectations macro models. The
basicidea isas follows. Suppose xisa rational expectation of
conditionalon some information set It then follows that:
x =x
+ (13)
whereis orthogonal to any element of the information set
Equation (13) implies that the use of x as a proxy for x gives rise to
a classical errors in variables problem. Itmaybe solved by using any
elementof thatis correlated with x as an instrument for x. We therefore
useaverage lagged dividend yield as an instrument for thecontem-
poraneous dividendyield in those months in which a dividend was paid.The
definitionof our instrument is d.t =(d.11
+d.i2
÷d.i3),which
is the previous year's dividend yield in this month with a minor correction
to allow for possible timing differences in two consecutive years.12Whend.t =0our instrumental variable was also set equal to zero. This rr.y
leavesome small residual bias but it should be common to allfirms,and
reasonably constant over time.
Our instrumental variable procedure differs from the iterated
least squares procedure used by Litzenberger and Rainasvaii(19T9,1982),
Gordonand Bradford (1980), and many other authors. These authors use a
first stage regression to create an expected dividend yield variable which
they then include in estimating an equation like (12). However, as
Hausman (1983) explains, this procedure is flawed in two respects. First,
unlessall the variables included on the right hand sideof (12) or any
other second stage equation are included in the first stage, the second
stage estimates will be inconsistent. Second, even if all the appropriate
variables are included, the standard errors will be overstated if a two
stage procedure is used. Our results are therefore the first which both
correct for information effects and also present consistent standard errors.13
It is important to recognize that the biases in estimated tax
effects due to information effects and miszneasurementof risk which have been
extensivelydiscussed in the literature should infect the yield—return rela-
tionship in a similar way during all tax regimes. By studying the differences
in estimated yield effects under alternative tax regimes, we are able to
measure tax effects with less contamination by other spurious factors than
many previous studies. Failures in r del of ex—ante returns and other
specification errors are likely to exert a roughly constant bias in all regi-
mes. The variation in coefficients across tax regimes should therefore be the—24
focus of our attention.
Our nnthly returns data were drawn from the London Business School
share price data base, provided by Mr. Jerexrr Sinithers of the LBS. This data
set includes monthly observations on prices, dividend payments, and market
indices for 3,500 U.K. firms during a twenty—six year period between 1955 and
1981. There are a total of over 550,000 company—months of share price infor-
mation. Although 3,500 companies are contained in the data set for at least
some inths, many appear for only short periods. The full data set contains
manyfirmswhich evidence severe non—trading.
To avoid infrequent trading problems and other difficulties asso-
ciated with data inconsistencies, we constructed a data subset for our analy-
sis. First, since the LBS tape provides monthly information on each month's
final recorded transactions price, the date of this transaction, and the
monthly high and low price, we were able to select only months in which
both the recorded price and the previous month's recorded price were trans-
actions prices for the last day of the nth. This restriction substan-
tially reduced the size of our sample, from 550,000 to about 1140,000
company months. This procedure both reduces the non—trading problem which may
lead to poor estimates of ,andavoids the problem of firms which
experienced ex—days during a month but were last traded before the ex—date.
Note that for these firms, the measured price decline due to the dividend
payment would be zero.
We also deleted i) any firms for which we had less than twelve
adinissable observations, on the grounds that the estimated 's would be poor—25—
guidesto actual betas, ii) outlying observations on dividend yield (>25% per
year) and share price zmvements (any observation corresponding to nre than a
50 percent price nvement during one nnth) and iii) any months involving non—
cash dividends or special rights issues. Finally, we examined only obser-
vations on large firms, measured by market value at the end of 1981. Our
results are based on all firms in the first third of the value distribution
although the findings are not particularly sensitive to choosing alternative
cut—off points. This firm size criterion reduced our sample size from about
135,000 to 11i4,000 company_months.hl
B. Results
Estimates of equations (ii) and (12) using the restricted data sample of
firms without announcement or information biases are presented in Table IV.
The resultsconfirm the daily findings and provide strong support for the
hypothesisthat taxes influence the relationship between dividend yields and
security returns. In the simplest specification, based on the CAPM, the esti-
mated tax penalty on dividends falls from Tto45 percent between Regimes II
and III. A drop—off of this magnitude corresponds very closely to the decline
in average marginal tax rates reported in Table I. The evidence on changes
between Regime I andIIis re difficult to interpret; there are tovementsin
bothdirections inthe various equations, and the hypothesis of equal coef-
ficients =
cz2)can never be rejected.
The lower rows of Table IV presents the results of estimating our




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































suggest the importance of tax changes, although in the firm—effect rtdels many
of the inter—regime coefficient changes are larger than the "predicted"
changes based on Table I. These large values reflect in part the failure of
the fixed effects estimator without time dummies to capture the variation due
to systematic forces at each moment of time. 'When the time dummies are added,
in equations 14e and 1f, the coefficients and their differences decline to
.-—..'.'——-—-. __.c. r1Ar, J...LUW..LUbVi. IU t.ri'i.
Themajorpuzzle inthe results is why the estimated tax rates are
sohigh. Their values suggest some sort of bias due to mismeasurement of risk.
In the CAPMmodels,addition of variables designed to capture these biases,
such as the inverse price, reduce the absolute size of the coefficients
slightly. The changes are not enough to resolve the nrstery, however. 'While
our coefficients are implausibly large, other authors using non—American data
have found similar values. Lakonishok and Verinaelen (1983) discoveredthat
Canadian share prices often fall on ex—days by only one third of thedividend
value,suggesting y of roughly two thirds. These incredible values for price
drop—offs should be a source of further study.
TableV presents estimates of the returns model for the entire
1955—1981period using our instrumental variable procedure for handling the
information effect problem. The results provide further support for the
hypothesis that taxes affect the relationship between dividend yields and
security returns.The estimated differences between 2and range between
.25and.30for the modified CAPM equations, and are somewhat larger in the



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































didnot lead to changes in security returns for onlya fewdaysaroundthe ex—
day. Rather, these results suggest a more persistent effect which can be
traced in monthly returns. This encouraging evidence is partially offset by
the comparison between the estimates of yforRegime IandRegime II.There
arefew dramatic changes, in spite of the fact that the introduction of a
capital gains taxshouldhave reduced y.Thehypothesis that = canbe
rejectedin only one of the six equations. We cannot therefore refute our
earlier conjecture that directdividend taxes are reflected in returns, while
the effect of capital gains taxes is much more subtle.
Theaddition of our risk proxies, the inverse price and average
dividend yield, does not alter the conclusions. While the variable
always enters with a statistically significant coefficient (the t—statistics
are often greater than ten), it leads to only minor reductions in the level of
the coefficients and virtually no changes in the inter—regime differences.
The average yield variable, (D7P), also has a significant positive
coefficient.15 This suggests that a higheraverage dividend yield raises the
ex ante return ona security, even in the months when itis not paying divi-
dends. However, the size of the estimated yield coefficients are often
implausibly large. The question of how dividend policy affects required
returns in non—dividend monthsshould be a subject of further study.
Inour attempt to learn whythe absolute sizes ofwere larger than
expected,we tried several alternative approaches to estimating the basic
equations. First, we added dt andasexplanatory variables in our esti—
mating equations. These had almost no effect. We experimented with more
restrictive data sets, focusing only on the very largest companies. This also-3 o:-
hadnoeffect. These results, however, underscore the possible biases in the
level of estimated dividend valuation coefficients andfurtheremphasize the
need for tests which rely upon genuine variation in the tax system in studying
dividends and taxes.—31.-
IV.Conclusions
Theresults in this paper suggest the importanceof taxes in deter-
miningthe relationship between dividend yields and stock market returns.
Usingboth dailyandmonthly data on British securities, we have documented
that changes in dividend taxation have a substantial effect on the premium
whichinvestors require to induce them to receive returns in theform ofdivi-
dends. Our results provide ample evidence of the importance of the biases
that have been extensively discussed in the literature. However, these biases
due to "information effects" and problems of measuring risk are common to all
tax regimes. Hence, our findings that the valuation of dividends changes
across tax regimes provides strong evidence that tax effects account for a
significant part of the positive relationship between yields and stock market
returns.
Our conclusions thus support inferences drawn by Litzenberger and
Ramaswanr (19T9, 1962) and Gordon and Bradford (1980), andcastdoubt on
those obtained by Miller and Scholes (1982) and Kalay (1982) from American
data. Of course, itispossible that our results cannot be extrapolated to
American securities markets. Certain tax rules, such as the investment
interest limitation stressed by Miller and Scholes (1978), differ between
Britain and the U.S. However, the significance of tax details for market
valuation of dividends has never been documented. Feenberg (1981) provides
evidence suggesting that dividends are taxable for more than 99 percent of
American investors.
It would be valuable to extend this work in several directions.—32-
First, some other countries, notably Canada, have significantly reformed divi-
dend taxation in recent years. Their experiences provide similar controlled
experiments for assessing tax effects. Second, our research has not examined
clientele effects, though changing tax rules offer the potential for further
exploration of this important issue. A natural project would consider whether
differences in & across firms have become less pronounced since the reductions
in dividend tax rates on most investors. Finally, an alternative method of
examining the nrket's valuation of dividends is suggested by Amoako—Adus
(1983) study of how the announcement of Canadian tax reform affected different
securities. It would be useful to apply his approach to British data,
although there are serious problems in dating the moment when expectations of
tax reform change.
Perhaps the st important item on the agenda for future research is
the development of a theory of why firms pay dividends in environments
where they are tax penalized. Such a theory is a necessary prelude to a full
understanding of the effects of dividend taxation on real economic behavior.
A survey of some existing approaches and some empirical tests of their impli-
cations is presented in Poterba and Summers (1981.).Footnotes
1. This was calculated by multiplying the $61 billion dollars of
dividends paid by the nonfinancial corporate sector (see the Economic Report
of the President, 1983, Table B—12) by an estimate of the average marginal tax
rate on dividends. Feldstein, Dicks—Mireaux and Poterba (1983) calculated
effective dividend tax rates for years prior to 1980. Their marginal tax rate
on dividends for 1979 was •315.Sincefew investors are likely to experience
changes in their marginal tax rates because of dividend receipts, the average
and marginal rates are very similar.
2. Equation (1) would hold if all investors faced the same tax
rates. In situations with important heterogeneity in the tax treatment of
dividends and capital gains, however, this expression would be replaced by a
complicated weigited average of individual tax parameters. Our exposition
focusses on "the marginal investor," in part because of difficulty with the
existing theories of how equilibrium is achieved in the presence of differen-
tial taxes. Shaefer (1983) addresses some of these questions.
3. Prior to 1973, some investor income tax was withheld "at source"
so the actual cheque received by shareholders was less than the announced
dividend. After 1973, shareholders received the full announced dividend.
4.Kaplanis(1983) discusses these trading rules in greater detail.
5.Dataon share ownership proportions for the U.K. may be found in
King, Naldrett, and Poterba (1981).
6. There have been several recent papers concerned with questions of
tax trading around ex—dividend days. These include Kalay (1982), Elton,
Gruber, and Rentzler (1983a) and Kalay (1983), all of which discuss the magni-
tude of transactions costs for trading around the ex-day. Lakonishok and
Vermaelen (1983) have reported tests of the short—term trading hypothesis for
Canada, and concluded that it may explain ex-day price movements there. The
source of these differences might be traced to institutional details or other
factors and clearly warrants further investigation.
7.Webegan with a sample of twenty large, non—nationalized
industrial firms selected from Fortune's 1981 listing of the world's largest
500 industrial corporations. For four firms, substantial evidence of non-
trading, especially early in the sample period, or other difficulties in
finding comparable price series through time, led to exclusion from the
sample.-.34 —
8. Weestimated the returns model by ordinary least squares,
'21
T
computed a = for each ifirm,and then weighted observations for the
t =1
th firmby1/ IZ.Thedifferences between the OLS and the GLS results were
typically minor.
9.Furtherwork must consider whether there are unusual share price
movements for the few days before or after ex—days, as Black and Scholes(1973)
suggested could explain U.S. ex—dividend behavior.
10. We attempted to estimate clientele effects for each tax regime by
adding squared dividend yields to our returns model. Whilethere were some
weak evidence of clientele effects, in the form of a negative coefficient on
the quadratic term, neitherthe size of this coefficient nor its differences
could be estimated with anyprecision given our small sample.
11.The assumption of independence across firms at anymomentis
usually rejected bysecurities data, and corrective estimation techniques
(Zeilner'sSUR method) have been applied by Gibbons (1982) and Hess (1982,
1983). Because our monthly sample of firms is so large, these procedures were
computationaily impractical.
12. The use of lagged dividend information forced us to eliminate
the first twelve monthly observations for each firm.
13. This instrumental variable procedure does not equire us to use
all available lagged information in forming our estimate of X.. It is con-
sistent so long as some elements of the relevant information set2 re
employed. Since it is a powerful tool for analyzing models wh±h involve
rational expectations, it should find ntjnierous applications in financial
economics.
14. Othervariablesin the monthly regressions were measured as
follows. We calculated the after—tax risk—free return as (1.-m)rf where t
isa time series on the weighted average marginal tax rate oninterest income
calculated by Ohrnial and Foldes (1975) and Ohrnial (1979), recently extended
by King, Naldrett, and Poterba (19814). The risk free return wasmeasured as
the short term Treasury bill rate from the LBS Indices file. We calculated
as the sum of the capital gain and dividend yield components onthe
FP—Actuaries 500 Share Industrial Index.
15. Rosenberg and Marathe (1979) and Elton, Gruber, and Rentzler
(1983a) experiment with a variety of similar modtfications to the basicCAPM
equation,adding average dividend yield variables—35—
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